OT Monitoring & SOC Build

What This Engagement Covers

Generic IT detection rules produce noise in an OT environment, because they neither speak industrial protocols nor know what normal looks like on your process. Monitoring only earns its place when alerts are specific enough for an operations team to act on.

This engagement covers the detection content, the escalation path between plant and security, and the playbooks — including the part most plans omit, which is who is authorised to decide that a process should be stopped.

Included in Scope

Use Cases & Detection Engineering

Detection written for your protocols and your process, not lifted from an IT rule set.

Use cases derived from your assets and threat scenarios
Rules tuned for ICS and SCADA protocol behaviour
Baselining to suppress noise before go-live

Data Collection & Integration

Getting the right telemetry to the right place, including into tooling you already run.

Sensor and collector placement
Integration with an existing SIEM where one is in use
Retention and data flow designed with IT and OT together

Playbooks & Escalation

What happens at 3am, written down before it is needed.

Incident playbooks for OT-specific scenarios
Escalation paths agreed between operations and security
Decision authority defined for process shutdown

Handover & Enablement

Your team operating it, not a dependency on ours.

Runbooks and documentation
Analyst enablement on OT context
Tuning review after an agreed bedding-in period

Standards Applied

Work on this engagement is mapped to the standards below, alongside whichever Indian obligations apply to your sector.

IEC 62443NIST CSF

Common Questions

Do we need a separate SOC for OT?

Usually not a separate team, but you do need OT-specific content and context. The common and workable pattern is an existing security team extended with OT detection content, OT escalation paths, and a direct line to plant operations — rather than a second SOC built from scratch.

Can this feed the SIEM we already have?

Yes. Where a SIEM is already in place, the work is integration and detection engineering rather than replacement. Being vendor-neutral, we would rather extend what you own than argue for a parallel stack.

Who responds when something is detected?

That is defined during the engagement and written into the playbooks. In OT the important question is not only who investigates but who is authorised to stop a process, because that decision has production and safety consequences of its own and cannot be made ad hoc during an incident.